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In the 
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PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REG-
ULATION, PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF UTAH, Hal S. Bennett, 
Chairman of the said Public Service 
Commission of Utah ; Donald Hacking 
and W. R. McEntire, members of said 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and Frank A. Yeamans, Secretary of 
said Public Service Commission of 
Utah, and THE DENVER & RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
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In the 
~: Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
Q~:· 
U~· 
I 
•··- .. 
'I \~.· 
r: 
s181~1 
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REG-
ULATION, PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF UTAH, Hal S. Bennett, 
Chairman of the said Public Service 
Commission of Utah; Donald Hacking 
and W. R. McEntire, members of said 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and Frank A. Yeamans, Secretary of 
said Public Service Commission of 
Utah, and THE DENVER & RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
CASE 
No. 7416 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT THE DENVER AND 
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
*" > . In this brief parties to this action may sometimes be 
·•H'·-1),-·' • designated as follows: petitioner, Provo City, as "the City," 
~!llj defendant Public Service Commission of Utah as "the Com-
mission," and defendant The Denver and Rio Grande West-
ifCcDI' ,,,~ ern Railroad Company as "the Rio Grande." 
~1},~1.·· 
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Subsequent to the filing of the brief of the City in this 
case, a stipulation was entered into between the parties to 
the effect that copies of certain instruments on file in the 
action in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah wherein the City and the Rio Grande or its Trustees 
were parties and on file in proceedings before the Commis-
sion wherein Rio Grande is applicant might be made a part 
of the record in this case with the same effect as if incor-
porated in a petition, answer or other pleading of a party 
herein. Copies of these instruments are now before this 
Court pursuant to said stipulation. The pages of these in-
struments are numbered 1 to 54, inclusive, and will be re-
ferred to by such page numbers in this brief as part of the 
record herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We believe the following facts, in addition to those set 
forth in the brief of the City, are necessary to a complete 
· understanding of the issues· presented in this case. 
The negotiations between the City and the Rio Grande 
covering the whole problem here involved, conducted in 19,43, 
had two aspects, the first being that the street area crossed 
by the railroad tracks then existing and to be constructed 
would be vacated, the second being that in lieu of the Ninth 
South Street area to be so vacated, there should be estab-
lished, at the cost and expense of the Rio Grande, another 
public street, which would have the effect of taking the place 
of the Ninth South Street crossing. This substituted street -~J 
or cut-off would extend from Ninth South Street northwest-
erly to Fifth East Street. By this shift in roadway, west-
~~ bound traffic on Ninth South Street would be diverted 
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through the cut-off into Fifth East Street and by way of 
University Avenue around the crossing, entering Ninth 
South Street at a point west of the crossing. Eastbound traf-
fic on Ninth South Street would proceed in the reverse di-
rection. In this way the same end result was achieved as 
though some other means of crossing, such as a grade sepa-
ration, had been constructed. Although this road was cir-
cuitous, it had the distinct advantage of saving the traveling 
public from the danger to life and limb which would result 
from public use of the Ninth South crossing. The Rio Grande 
performed its part of the proposal by acquiring and laying 
out the cut-off road. This road in lieu of the Ninth South 
crossing has been used by the traveling public since 1943 
(R. 3-4, 31-32). 
Prior to construction of the railroad tracks which were 
built in 1943, there were four main line tracks across Ninth 
South Street in Provo, being from east to west those of the 
Salt Lake & Utah railroad, Denver and Rio Grande Western 
railroad, Utah railway, and Union Pacific railroad, and also 
four additional tracks crossing said street, one of the Denver 
, and Rio Grande Western railroad, two of Utah railway, and 
· one of the Union Pacific railroad. When the additional rail-
road construction of 1943 had been completed, there were 
~~ a total of twenty-one railroad tracks in or across Baid street, 
eight of which had been constructed by the Trustees of Rio 
~1 Grande (R. 5). The tracks of Rio Grande across Ninth South 
Street form a part of its Provo freight yards and are used l and employed by it in the movement of freight traffic pass-
~ ing through, destined to, and originating in the Provo area I (R. 5) 0 
~ 
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The railroad tracks in question do not extend along 
Ninth South Street but cross the street, some at approxi-
mately right angles and others on a bearing of approximately 
north 54 o west. The street area crossed by the railroad 
tracks in question was not within the original townsite area 
of Provo City. The fee to this street area is in the abutting 
property owners, and the right of public travel over this 
street area arose from user. Railroad companies are the 
owners in fee of the abutting property ( R. 9) . 
The area of said street crossed and occupied by said 
railroad tracks was physically closed to travel by the erec-
tion of barricades in May, 1943 (R. 30). The crossing has 
not been opened since that date and remains closed at this 
time. 
The location of the tracks, the street area which is now 
closed, and surrounding streets and areas are graphically 
shown upon the print attached to this brief and made a part 
thereof as Appendix A. 
ARGUMENT 
The City here seeks a permanent writ, prohibiting the 
Commission from conducting a proceeding upon the applica-
tion of the Rio Grande ( R. 35-38) now before it. 
The City's petition for an alternative writ of prohibi-
tion sets forth substantially the same facts as those con- " 
tained in its brief. The defendants, by demurrer interposed 
herein, raise the issue of the sufficiency in law of the City's 
petition. 
The office of the writ of prohibition has been defined ·:r 
by this Court as being a process by which a superior court :1 
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prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or ex-
ercising a jurisdiction with which it has not been invested 
by law and to arrest it from exercising a want or an excess 
of legal jurisdiction and not to prevent or correct an erron-
eous exercise of jurisdiction. Campbell et al. v. Durand, 39 
Utah 118, 115 P. 986. 
No question of fact is or properly can be involved. The 
facts are presented here as a means of determining the issue 
of law. That issue, as we see it, is simply the single question 
as to whether the Commission has jurisdiction to entertain 
and act upon the application of the Rio Grande now before it. 
The City attacks the jurisdiction of the Commission 
upon three grounds, namely: (1) that the application before 
the Commission is a subterfuge to avoid the issue of juris-
diction of the Commission to order the closing of a city street 
where railroad tracks cross it; (2) that the Public Utilities 
Act does not give the Commission jurisdiction to order the 
closing of a public street within a municipality; and (3) 
that there is a constitutional restraint upon the jurisdiction 
of the Commission. We shall consider the contentions of the 
City in the same order as presented by it. 
POINT I 
As we analyze the contentions of the City under this 
point, two propositions are advanced by it, namely : ( 1) the 
Rio Grande, by its application, has assumed that the Ninth 
South crossing is closed, whereas, in legal contemplation, 
it is now open; and (2) the Commission cannot assume jur-
isdiction because the issues which Rio Grande seeks to bring 
before it are res judicata. 
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It is recognized by all parties to this action that the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit 
determined that the City was not estopped to deny that the 
street area of Ninth South occupied by r~ilroad tracks had 
been vacated. No dispute does or can exist as to the deter-
mination of that court. 
Equally clear, however, is the fact that the Ninth South 
Street crossing has been physically closed for more than six 
years. The public has not used the street area occupied by 
railroad tr~cks since May, 1943. In fact the public never 
has used the crossing which now exists. When the public 
last used this street area there were but eight tracks across 
the street. Now there are some twenty-one tracks, in or 
across said street, constituting a part of a busy freight yard, 
accommodating a large volume of railroad traffic. The pub-
lic has never experienced the hazard and the danger to life 
and limb which would necessarily flow from the public use 
of this crossing, nor have the railroads experienced the effect 
on their operations of forcing this cross~ng open. 
The Rio Grande, in its application now pending before 
the Commission and in exhibits attached thereto, fully set 
forth the pertinent facts and the contentions of the City 
theretofore made (R. 35-54). The Rio Grande has not in-
tended anywhere in this long and difficult controversy to 
engage in subterfuge or sophistry. The form of the applica-
tion seems to it not to be material as two propositions must 
be admitted by all : First, that the City has not vacated the 
street area in question, and, second, that the present street 
area has never been opened to a crossing of the railroad 
tracks and facilities which are now located therein. It seems 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
also to be equally clear that if the Commission grants relief 
as prayed for by the Rio Grande, the Commission will refuse 
to open for public travel a street crossing now physic·ally 
closed, and the Commission will by its order close a crossing 
now open in contemplation of law. 
,If it be said that the Commission's order in granting the 
relief sought by the Rio Grande would have the effect of 
closing a street crossing now open in contemplation of law, 
then one of the essential elements which the Commission 
must necessarily consider in such a determination will be the 
fact that no public travel has ever been conducted over such 
crossing and that the public has never been subjected to the 
hazard and danger incident to the use of such crossing. 
The test of jurisdiction after all is the power lawfully 
to deal with the general subject involved in the proceeding: 
The general subject here involved is railroad track crossings 
of a city street. The Commission is undertaking to deal with 
the subject by ordering the crossing opened or closed. 
The form in which Rio Grande set forth the facts and in 
which it couched its prayer for relief before the Commission 
cannot seriou·sly be contended to bear upon the jurisdiction 
of the Commission. The Commission's inquiry will be dedi-
cated to a consideration as to whether from all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the controversy public conven-
ience and necessity require that the Ninth South Street cros-
sing be made available for public travel. The manner in 
which the inquiry is instituted is a matter of form. The sub-
stance of the Commission's jurisdiction is found in the sub-
ject matter of the inquiry and what the Commission under-
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takes to do. All parties are here earnestly endeavoring to 
determine the jurisdiction of the Commission in such a mat-
ter. If the City believes that question of jurisdiction may be 
more simply stated in a proposition which inquires whether 
the Commission has power and jurisdiction to order closed 
the street crossing in question, defendants are willing 
that the question be so posed and are not inclined to quibble 
over the form in which the application was presented to the 
Commission by the Rio Grande. Certainly the jurisdiction of 
the Commission will not depend upon the form of the peti-
tion or 'application brought before it but rather upon the 
substance of what the Commission undertakes to do. 
The second proposition advanced by the City under this 
point requires more detailed consideration. The Rio Grande 
brought suit against the City in the United States District 
Court of Utah upon the theory that the acts of the City com-
plained of by it estopped the City from denying th~t the 
street area in question had been vacated, the contention of 
the Rio Grande being in substance that the acts of the City 
were such that its position was the same as though the 
street area had been vacated by ordinance. The trial court 
in its findings so concluded. On the appeal to the United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, the same 
issues were presented. Judge Bratton who wrote the major-
ity opinion stated the problem thus : 
iiit 
':Uri 
... The company filed proceedings to enjoin the r~~~ 
city, the mayor, and the commissioners from proceed- ~~~( 
ing further in that direction. Is1sues were joined, and ~~~~ 
the causes were tried to the court upon stipulated 1 
facts, documentary evidence, and oral testimony. Con- ~n 
eluding that the defendants and all citizens and resi- ~tot 
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dents of Provo were estopped from alleging or con-
tending that the street had not been closed, vacated, 
and abandoned as required by law, the court entered 
judgments enjoining the defendants from. interfering 
with the barricades and from reopening the street. 
The defendants appealed (R. 16). 
Judge Phillips, who dissented, in viewing the case in the 
same way observed : 
It seems to me that the instant case is one where 
right and justice require a holding that the city is 
estopped to reopen Ninth South Street across the 
yards at the ground level (R. 22). 
The result of the litigation in the federal court was 
therefore a determination that Provo City was not estopped 
by its acts to deny that the street area had been vacated. 
What is the issue before the Commission on the Rio 
Grande's pending application? The issue thus presented, as 
we see it, is whether public convenience and necessity require 
the Ninth South Street crossing to be closed. Thus it is seen 
that while public rights were incidentally involved in the 
action before the federal court, the real issue there in-
volved private rights between the City on the one hand 
and the railroad companies on the other, while the issue 
before the Commission, although touching private rights, 
is primarily concerned with questions of public policy. 
The division of jurisdiction between the court and the 
Commission is therefore sharply defined and of peculiar im-
portance in the case now before this Court. The jurisdiction 
of the Commission is in a measure much broader than that 
of the court. In proceedings before the Commission the 
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questions are primarily and essentially public questions. An 
examination of Section 76-4-15, U. C. A. 1943, which will 
be considered in further detail hereafter, demonstrates leg-
islative intent that the Commis1sion in acting thereunder 
should engage in considerations of a public character. It is 
therefore S<een that not the rights of the railroad companies, 
alone or of the City as such are essentially involved in the 
application now pending before the Commission but rather 
the rights of the public generally, which rights embrace not 
only those of residents of Provo City and Utah ·County but 
those of all persons who may be affected by the determina-
tions which are made by the Commission with respect to 
the crossing involved. 
Both the court and the Commission have been careful 
to recognize the jurisdiction of the other in the proceedings 
which have already been taken. Thus the federal court in 
its judgment concluded that: 
4. Under the provisions of Section 76-4-15, sub-
section 3, Utah Code Annotated 1943, the Public Ser-
vice Commission of Utah has jurisdiction, if it finds 
that public convenience and necessity demand the 
establishment, creation or construction of a crossing 
of a street or highway above or under the railroad 
tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road, to require the establishment of such a crossing 
and such crossing may thereupon become a public 
highway and crossing. This Court is not disposed 
to interfere with the exercise of such jurisdiction and 
power of the Public Service Commission either as to 
the Trustees or T'he Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, but on the contrary is disposed 
and will use its good offices to aid in the elimination 
'of inconvenience to the public caused by barricading 
~. 
)I 
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of Ninth South Street, at the earliest possible time 
consistent with the war effort, by construction at 
or near Ninth South Street or University Avenue of 
some divided grade crossing when labor and mater-
ials become available therefor (R. 12). 
and in its decree further ordered that: 
... provided, however, that neither Provo City 
nor any of its officers, agents, residents or persons 
is enjoined from petitioning the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah to exercise its jurisdiction, under 
Section 76-4-15, subsection 3, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, by finding that public convenience and neces-
sity require, and by ordering the ·establishment of a 
crossing of a street or highway above or under the 
tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road at or in the vicinity of Ninth South Street or 
University Avenue ... (R. 14). 
The Commission in its report in the first proceeding 
before it is careful to point out the area of its jurisdiction 
and that of the court where it observes that: 
Provo City alleges that it is inequitable and un-
just for this Commission to overrule a decision by a 
United States Court. This Commission does not as-
sume to have any such power or jurisdiction. This 
Commission, however, is charged by statute with the 
duty of determining whether public convenience and 
necessity demand the opening of a road or highway 
across the railroad tracks of Applicants and iS' exer-
cising that jurisdiction in this Report and the Order 
to be made pursuant thereto. Neither the United 
States District Court nor the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has passed upon the jurisdiction of this Com-
mission in this matter (R. 32-3). 
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The rules of law which control the problem here pre-
sented are, we believe, thes.e: Where issues of law are pre-
sented in controversies which are of an essentially private 
character, courts of law are vested with a primary jurisdic-
tion for the determination of such issues. Where, on the 
other hand, issues which are of a public character and relate 
to questions primarily of fact, arising from some activity of 
a public utility, and are by statute vested in a regulatory 
body, such as the Commission, are for the determination 
of the Commission. A concurrent jurisdiction may thus ex-
sist in which courts are entitled to pass upon questions of 
law involving private rights and regulatory bodies, such as 
the Commission, are entitled to pass upon questions of public 
right involving matters of fact relating to utilities under 
their control. There are and may be certain cases lying in 
between the fields here suggested in which a court may have 
the right to take original jurisdiction but in which the jur-
isdiction of a commission, when once assumed, is complete 
and determinative of all issues involved. 
An examination of the cases and text authority will, we 
believe, fully sustain the rules above announced. 
The general proposition is announced in 42 Am. J ur., 
Public Administrative Law, Sec. 252, as follows: 
In some circumstances, two remedies may be 
available to the same party for the enforcement of the 
same right, one in the judicial and the other in the 
administrative forum, one by virtue of statute and 
the other under the common law ... There may exist 
a dual remedy, one in the judicial and another in the 
administrative forum, in a sense other than that just 
described. Some administrative agencies exist only 
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for the enforcement and protection of public, as dis-
tinguished from private, rights, and where an act 
constitutes a violation of both a public and a private 
right, the administrative forum may present the 
proper remedy for the former and the judicial forum 
the proper remedy for the latter. 
The cases sustain this statement of law. Typical of sev-
eral of such cases is that of City of Oakland v. Key System, 
149 P. (2d) 195 (Cal.), where the court announces the prin-
ciples as follows : 
As previously stated, based upon the findings of 
fact, the court as a conclusion of law found that the 
use of the property described in the first cause of 
action "is a matter primarily within the jurisdiction 
of the Railroad Commission." Ordinarily this state-
ment is correct. However, the jurisdiction is not ex-
clusively with the commission. Questions of public 
convenience and necessity, and matters directly re-
lating thereto, in connection with the operation of 
public utility franchises, are the concern of the com-
mission; legal disputes pertaining to a continuance or 
cancellation of a franchise at the end of its designated 
period are solely within the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The cancellation of a fanchise during the term of its 
existence for a cause specified therein is primarily a 
legal question and must be decided by the courts, but 
if convenience of the public is involved and contin-
ued operation is necessary, such interest may be par-
amount to the rights of the parties to the franchise, 
in which case the jurisdiction of the Railroad Com-
mission is dominant and controlling. A restriction 
or limitation in one case may not apply under the 
facts of another. 
Thus, in certain cases and as to certain problems 
relating to public utilities the jurisdiction of the com-
mission is exclusive. As to other matters the regular 
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law courts have jurisdiction. In between these two 
well defined fields there is a somewhat ill defined 
field in which the law courts have jurisdiction unless 
the commission has elected to act as to the particular 
subject matter. If it has elected to so act the exercise 
of such jurisdiction ousts the law courts of any jur-
isdiction assumed by them. (p. 199.) 
A !urther Calfornia case of particula:r interest is that 
of Miller v. Railroad Commission, 70 P. (2d) 164. In this 
case an injunction was secured in a state court and there-
after proceedings were taken before the California Railroad 
Commission. As in the case at bar, the contention was made 
that the action before the court was res judicata. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held otherwise, citing in support of 
the jurisdiction of the commission Section 31 of the Californ-
ia Public Utilities Act, which is ident~cal with Section 76-4-1 
of our Code. The view of the California court under the 
issues presented to it is that the assumption of jurisdiction 
by the California commission had the effect of rendering 
nugatory the judgment of the court theretofore entered, 
which prior to the proceeding before the commission was 
binding upon the parties. It is the position of defendants 
that the issues before the Court and the Commission in this 
case are of such a distinct character that the determination 
of the law point in the Court is not abrogated by a decision 
which the Commission might make closing the street cross-
ing which is now in contemplation of law open. If, however, 
the contention of the City in this case is valid that such an 
order of the Commission would have the effect of abrogating 
the decision of the federal court, then the decision of the 
California Supreme Court in the Miller case is direct author-
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ity that such result is entirely immaterial once jurisdiction 
of the Commission has attached. The California court in 
reaching its decision says in part: 
Applying the principles of law announced above, 
we conclude that the superior court of the county of 
Modoc had jurisdiction to render the judgment in 
the case brought by petitioners and others against the 
C. \V. Clarke Company, in which it was adjudged 
that the company was a public utility and that the 
plaintiffs in said action were the beneficiaries in the 
use of the water devoted to public use by said utility. 
We further hold that said judgment was valid and 
binding upon the parties to said action until the Rail-
road Commission assumed jurisdiction of said utility 
for the purpose of regulating its operations, and, 
upon its assumption of jurisdiction over the activi-
ties of said utility, any order or judgment of the 
superior court in conflict with the orders of the ,com-
mission is to that extent ineffective and of no bind-
ing effect upon the parties thereto. This conclusion 
must necessarily follow from the provisions of the 
Constitution and the Public Utilities Act, and partic-
ularly from section 31 thereof, which provides that: 
"The railroad commission is hereby vested with 
power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate ev-
ery public utility in the state and to do all things, 
whether herein specifically designated or in addition 
thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the 
exercise of such power and jurisdiction." 
The judgment of the superior court of Modoc 
county was not therefore res judicata as to any right 
of the plaintiffs as beneficiaries in the use of the 
water devoted to a public use by the defendant in said 
action as against the future consideration of said right 
by the commission. When the Railroad Commission 
assumed jurisdiction over said public utility, as it 
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did at the time of the hearing of the application of 
the Clarke Company to increase the rates for water 
delivered to petitioners, which resulted in the order 
of September 17, 1934, its jurisdiction over the activ-
ities of said utility was exclusive and plenary, ex-
cept by the proceedings in review to this court, un-
hampered and unrestrained by the previous judg-
ment of the superior court of the county of Modoc. 
(p. 169.) 
As illustrative of many other cases supporting the rule 
announced above is that of Steele v. Clinton Electric Light 
& Power Co., 193 Atl. 613 (Conn.) wherein the court held 
that: 
The fact that a public service commission has 
jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes over 
charges for service does not deprive equity of juris-
diction to enjoin the shutting off of service to coerce 
payment of a disputed bill. (p. 616.) 
The contention that the issues raised before the Com-
mission by the application of Rio Grande are res judicata 
is without merit. 
POINT II 
The contention of the City under this point is stated to 
be that the Public Utilities Act does not give the Public Ser-
vice Commission jurisdiction to order the closing of a public 
street within a municipality. The statement of this proposi-
tion tends to raise an issue which is not actually pre-
sented. The question, as we see it, is whether the Public 
Utilities Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission to close :: 
the area of this city street which is crossed by railroad tracks il1 
here involved. ~~ ~ 
car 
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As indicated in the City's brief, both the City and the 
Commission derive their powers from the same source, 
namely, the Legislature, and in the absence of a constitu-
tional limitation, the Legislature has the clear power to con-
fer upon the Commission the jurisdiction here questioned. 
The statute under which the Commission undertakes to act 
(Section 76-4-15) is broad and comprehensive. It provides 
as follows: 
(1) No track of any railroad shall be con-
structed across a public road, highway or street at 
'grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation 
be constructed across the track of any other railroad 
or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the 
track of a street railroad corporation be constructed 
across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, 
without the permission of the commission having 
first been secured; provided, that this subsection 
shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully exist-
ing tracks. The commission shall have the right to 
refuse its permission or to grant it upon such terms 
and conditions as it may prescribe. 
{2) The Commission shall have the exclusive 
power to determine and prescribe the manner, in-
cluding the particular point of crossing, and the 
terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use 
and protection of each crossing of one railroad by 
another railroad or street railroad, and of a street 
railroad by a railroad and of each crossing of a public 
road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and 
of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter 
or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of 
such crossings to certain types of traffic in the in-
terest of public safety and is vested with power and 
it shall be its duty to designate the railroad crossings 
to be traversed by school busses and motor vehicles 
carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where 
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in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation 
of grades at any such crossing heretofore or here-
after established, and to prescribe the terms upon 
which such separation shall be made and the propor-
tions in which the expense of the alteration or aboli-
tion of such crossings or the separation of such 
grades shall be divided between the railroad or street 
railroad corporations affected, or between such cor-
porations and the state, county, municipality or other 
public authority in interest. 
( 3) Whenever the commission shall find that 
public convenience and necessity demand the estab-
lishment, creation or ·construction of a crossing of a 
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or 
lines of any public utility, the commission may by 
order, decision, rule or decree require the establish-
ment, construction or creation of such crossing, and 
such crossing shall thereupon become a public high-
way and crossing. 
Examining subparagraph (2) of said section and delet-
ting unnecessary language, it seems clearly to read as fol-
lows: 
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive 
power to determine and prescribe the manner . . . 
of each crossing of a public road or highway by a 
railroad or street railroad and of a street by a rail-
road or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such 
crossing. 
The abolition of the crossing of a street by a railroad 
or of a railroad by a street certainly can mean nothing more 
than the closing of such crossing. 'The language of the stat-
ute could hardly be more clear or comprehensive. 
;:it 
The foregoing Section 76-4-15 was Section 14 of the 
original Public Utilities Act of 1917, and has not been sub- 1)~t 
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stantially amended since its original enactment. By the pro-
visions of Section 34 of the original act, all acts or parts 
of acts inconsistent therewith are repealed. 
The City relies upon the provisions of Section 15-8-8, 
U. C. A. 1943, which are that, 
They (cities) may lay out, establish, open, alter, 
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise im-
prove streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, 
parks, airports and public grounds, and may vacate 
the same or parts thereof, by ordinance. 
This section is of long standing. It runs back at least 
to the Revised Statutes of 1898, where it substantially 
appears as Subsections 8 and 88 of Section 206. Hav-
ing been in force at the time of the passage of the 
Public Utilities Act, the latter section was, to the extent 
that it was inconsistent with that act, repealed. A careful 
analysis will demonstrate, however, that the conflict be-
tween Sections 76-4-15 and 15-8-8 relates only to a partic-
ular problem, namely, crossings, and only to the extent of the 
areas involved in crossings does the Legislature withdraw 
from cities a power over streets enjoyed by them prior ·to 
the passage of the Public Utilities Act. 
The solution to any conflict between these sections and 
the course of judicial determination with respect thereto 
has been laid out and prescribed by two decisions of this 
Court. 
The first of such decisions is that of Denver and Rio 
Grande Railroad Company v. Public Utilities Commission 
of Utah, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479, which will hereafter be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
referred to as "the Rio Grande case". The other and later 
decision is that of Union Pacific Railroad Company et al. 
v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P. (2d) 
469, hereafter referred to as "the Union Pacific case". 
In the Rio Grande case the facts were that application 
had been made to the Commission by the railroad for a cross-
ing over a street within a municipality without the railroad's 
having first obtained a franchise or authority from Salt Lake 
City or Salt Lake County so to do. The Court held that the 
statute conferring power upon the Commission, which is 
Section 76-4-15 above quoted, was capable of only one con-
struction and that all acts and parts of acts in conflict with 
the statute were repealed, the language of.the Court being 
as follows: 
... Not only are the sections of the statute spe-
cifically mentioned in the act repealed, but "all acts 
and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions o~ 
of this act" are repealed. Since the act, in language 1J! 
so plain that it will admit of but one construction, Gn~ 
confers on the commission the exclusive power to de-
termine and prescribe the manner, and the terms ~~ 
upon which railroad companies may construct, main- ~GTI1 
tain, and operate railroad tracks across public roads, r:~ 
highways, and streets within the state and repeals irali 
all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the pro- ~~n 
visions conferring such power, but little need or can Gr], 
be said on the subject, except that the commission l:!i 
erred in declining to act on the application made by :",~ 
the petitioner for crossing permits. (p. 480.) 
The facts in the Union Pacific case were that Ogden City 
had granted a franchise to Union Pacific to construct tracks 
along a street for a distance of some 1.5 miles. The provi-
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sions of the franchise had not been complied with by the 
railroad, and Ogden City revoked the franchise, whereupon 
the railroad undertook to remove the tracks and the Com-
mission assumed jurisdiction to prevent it from doing so. 
This Court held that the matter of the crossing of railroad 
tracks over city streets was exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission, whereas the matter of the constuc-
tion or maintenance of railroad tracks along city streets 
under franchise was not granted to the Commission but re-
mained in the city. Consequently the city, having the con-
trol of the granting of such franchises and such tracks, must 
necessarily have like control over the revocation of such fran-
chises and the Commission was without jurisdiction in the 
premises, the meat of the Court's decision being found in its 
language as follows : 
... As we view the matter, therefore, said Sec-
tion 76-4-15, while it was intended to give to the 
Commission power over street crossings within cities 
and towns, and did give it such power, nevertheless, 
did not repeal the general powers theretofore confer-
red upon municipalities to control the use and occu-
pancy of their streets by railroads. Such power was 
originally conferred by the Legislature upon munic-
ipalities; it has not been expressly repealed, and we 
do not find anything in subsequent legislation which 
is clearly and manifestly repugnant to that power. 
It therefore remains in municipalities where it was 
originally placed. (p. 198.) 
From these decisions these propositions therefore ap-
pear to be established : the control of railroad crossings over 
streets or streets over railroads is exclusively within the jur-
isdiction of the Commission ; the control of railroad fran-
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chises to operate upon and along streets has not been taken 
from the cities by the Legislature and still remains in the 
municipality. 
'The control of crossings, by the express provision of 
the statute above quoted, clothes the Commission with power 
not only to regulate but to close such crossings. Here, then, 
is a grant of power as clear in its terms as could be ex-
pressed; and that power may be exercised by the Commis-
sion unless a constitutional restraint exists. 
POINT III 
The position of the City under this point appears to be 
that if said Section 76-4-15 grants power in the Commission 
to close a street, such grant of power is unconstitutional. 
The statement· of the City under this point is broader 
than the problem presented. The problem presented is ac-
tually whether the power granted by the Legislature to the 
Commission under said section to close a street area occu-
pied by rail crossings is constitutional. Stated in its simpl-
est form, as we see it, the problem is whether the Commis-
sion may constitutionally close the crossing here involved. 
The determination of this question requires a consideration 
of certain basic problems. 
:·n+ 
:a. 
The City assumes that but one public highway is· here :~~u 
involved, namely, Ninth South Street in Provo. The fact ~~tl 
is that several public highways are involved. That railroads 
are public highways of commerce is now so firmly estab- ~111 
lished by numerous decisions that no citation is here neces- 'dlat 
sary. It is upon the fundamental proposition that ralroads 't'li/i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
are public highways of commerce that the power of public 
regulation of railroads rests. We are not inclined to mini-
mize the importance of city streets as public highways. 
However, it should also be recognized that railroads are 
likewise highways of the greatest importance, not only to 
local communities and the several states but also to the 
nation as well. We therefore have here involved not· a ques-
tion of a street highway alone but actually a question of 
conflict in use of a portion of space between a street high-
way and rail highways. 
With the development of rail highways in our national 
economy, it became inevitable that these highways should 
cross street highways and vice versa. These crossings nec-
essarily precipitated conflicts. and contests for the use of 
space at the points of intersection. The controversies in-
volving as they did broad questions of state and national 
concern, and necessitating the balancing and weighing of 
convenience and necessity to the users of both street and 
rail highways, it was essential that these cont:r:oversies be 
withdrawn from municipalities or other local bodies and 
that they be vested in tribunals especially created for their 
consideration. The tribunals thus created were regulatory 
bodies such as the Commission. 
The statute (Section 76-4-15) here assailed on constitu-
tional grounds by the City grants the Commission broad 
powers with respect to rail and highway crossings. Under 
.the powers so granted, this Court has held that the Commis-
llb sion may require a city to share its street space with a rail 
highway at the point of crossing. (D. & R. G. R. R. Co. v. 
1
. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, supra.) The City con-
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cedes the power of the Commission in this respect. In this 
concession it seems to this defendant that the City actually 
concedes the power of the Commission to close a crossing. It 
is elementary that a railroad may not actually enjoy joint 
use with others of the intersecting space between its rails 
and a street. A vehicle may not use street space at the same 
time as does a railroad without loss of life and property to 
both users. The rails necessarily require exclusive use of 
the space at such time, and for the times of such use the 
street is closed to vehicles and pedestrians. We would sup-
pose, also, that no contention would be made by the City that 
the Commission would not have the power to barricade or 
otherwise effectively enforce the closing of the crossing 
during the periods of railroad use. It is but an extension in 
degree of this power of withdrawal of use to conclude that 
the Commission shall have the power to withdraw use of the 
contested space entirely from vehicles and pedestrians and 
order that such space shall be devoted entirely to rail high-
way use--in short, that the crossing shall be closed. 
The City contends that the Commission has power to 
compel rail highways to share crossing space with street 
highways. There would seem to be no doubt of the power 
of the Commission in this respect. The City, while admitting 
the power of the Commission to open a crossing, strenuously 
denies the power of the Commission to close a crossing. A 
brief exploration will, we believe, demonstrate the fallacy 
of the City's position in this respect. Assume that the Com-
mission orders the opening of a crossing. Thereafter rail 
traffic at the point of crossing increases ten fold in volume. 
At the same time, through construction of other highway 
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facilities, street traffic dwindles to a mere trickle. The con-
siderations of public convenience and necessity which re-
quired the crossing to be opened no longer exist. Is the Com-
mission without power to control what it has done and re-
store the crossing space to the exclusive use of the rail high-
way? 
In the case at bar, by public user a street highway ex-
isted over an area crossed by a rail highway. Now, through 
the industrialization of certain Utah communities, twenty-
one tracks cross the street where in 1943 but eight tracks 
existed. The volume of railroad traffic has expanded tre-
mendously. The City and the Rio Grande have through their 
own acts altered the crossing and provided the public with 
another street for r ·Tt lieu of and in extension of the 
street area now phys... _ ... y closed. Is the Commission, in the 
light of these facts, without power to say that this crossing 
space shall be devoted exclusively to rail highways? 
These considerations, we believe, enable us to determine 
the constitutional problem here presented. 
We have not one but two constitutional provisions to be 
considered. The City has cited Article VI, Section 29, which 
provides that : 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any 
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, 
whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to 
select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal func-
tion. 
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Consideration should, however, also be given to Section 
12 of Article XII, which provides that: 
All railroad and other transportation companies 
are declared to be common carriers, and subject to 
legislative control; and such companies shall receive 
and transport each other's passeng7rs and freight, 
without discrimination or unnecessary delay. 
The City contends that the reference to municipal func- :~1 
tion in the first article above relates to the laying out, es-
tablishment, opening and vacating of streets. Assuming ~1r 
that such authority over streets is a municipal function, we 
believe it clear that this power of a municipality over strbets 
is a power which relates in a general way to the control of 
the municipality over its streets. It is such a power as was 
referred to and considered by this Court in Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. et al. v. Public Service Commission, supra. Quite 
distinct, however, from this general power of cities over 
streets is the special problem of rail and street crossings. 
This, as we have shown, is not a problem of local government 
but essentially a problem in which broad state and national 
considerations are involved. The problem of crossings, be-
cause of the state and national considerations involved, is in 
its final analysis a problem of the control and regulation of 
rail highways. Because of this nature of the problem, the 
framers of the Constitution saw fit to vest control of that 
problem in the Legislature by the provisions of Section 12 
of Article XII above quoted. This solution is the logical 
result of the underlying philosophy which distinguishes the 
Union Pacific case from the Rio Grande case cited supra. 
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The City's brief serves to confuse rather than clarify 
the problem. The City asserts that the control of streets is 
a municipal function, not to be exercised by the Commission. 
At the same time the City contends that the Commission may 
lay out, establish, or open streets over rail highways, which, 
by its own reasoning, would obviously be a municipal func-
tion. 
This confusion on the part of the City demonstrates to 
this defendant that the problem of rail crossings as such is 
not a municipal problem and was never intended by the 
framers of the Constitution to be such. The problem of rail 
crossings is entirely distinct from the general powers of 
cities over streets and is a special problem, bound· up with 
considerations of railroad transportation over which the 
Legislature, by the provisions of Section 12 of Article XII, 
very properly retained control. 
We have examined the cases ·cited by the City in itS 
brief. The case of City of Chicago v. Hastings Express Co. 
et al., 17 N. E. (2d) 576, 369 Ill. 610, was cited by City under 
its Point II. We believe the case is not authority under that 
point but is of importance in connection with the considera-
tion of Point III. The Illinois Supreme Court holds that the 
city license there sustained is not a regulatory ordinance but 
merely a revenue ordinance. The court further points out 
that the Public Utilities Act of Illinois was designed to vest 
in the Commerce Commission of that state exclusive juris-
diction over those matters which are an intimate part of 
and of the closest connection with the public utility service 
and with transportation itself. That the matter of rail 
crossings is closely connected with and bears directly upon 
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rail transportation should admit of no doubt. The federal 
court, in the action before it, found that the opening and 
continuation of Ninth South Street across the railroad yards 
and tracks here involved would make necessary much slower 
handling of trains and parts of trains in said yards and 
would reduce the usefulness and efficiency of the same to 
the extent of approximately fifty per cent, and would greatly 
increase the cost of operation of the railroads, in addition 
to causing a serious danger to the public (R. 6-7). This 
serves to demonstrate that the problems here presented 
bear directly and intimately upon the movement of com-
merce over rail highways and are therefore problems di-
rectly within the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
The decision in Logan City v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961, is, in our opinion, not in point. 
The question there presented was one of the jurisdiction of 
the Commission over municipal power plants. This Court 
found upon careful analysis that such jurisdiction would 
necessarily have a direct bearing upon money, property and 
taxes of the municipality. No problem such as here pre-
sented was involved. 
We have considered the remaining cases cited by the 
City from other jurisdictions. They do not seem to us to be 
controlling or of particular assistance in the solution of our 
problem. We shall therefore not extend this brief to cover 
an analysis of these decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore concluded that the contentions of the City 
are without merit; that the Commissio:p. has lawful juris-
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diction of the issues raised by the application of the Rio 
Grande now before it; and that the demurrer of the Rio 
Grande to the City's petition for a permanent writ of pro-
hibition should be sustained and this action dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defendant The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company. 
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